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I. Map Displaying Power of Traditional Leaders over Land by Sub-National Region
The figure below (omitted from the main manuscript for reasons of space) indicates the percentage of respondents in different regions of the Afrobarometer countries that said traditional chiefs, rather than the national or local government, had primary responsibility for administering land in their community. The models are OLS models in which the dependent variable is the proportion of votes for the incumbent candidate in each chiefdom. In cases where the incumbent candidate did not run for office again, the dependent variable is equal to the proportion of votes for his or her successor as the local incumbent party's candidate. This measure was constructed by matching polling district maps with chiefdom boundaries, and then aggregating polling district results to the chiefdom level. The independent variable of interest in these models is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the incumbent party's candidate had a stronger relationship to the chief than the candidate from the other major party in the area. This information was collected as part of a survey of chiefs administered in 2007. The models also include controls for the incumbent party's vote share in 2001, whether the incumbent candidate was running, which party was the local incumbent party, the number of candidates for the parliamentary seat, and whether the incumbent and opposition party candidates were from the chiefdom. The first model shows the effect of chiefs' relationships to MPs in chiefdoms that did not have clear ethnic cues in the election (i.e. places where neither Bemba speakers nor Tonga speakers made up a majority of the population). Across places where voters were not ethnically aligned with a major political party, the candidate with the closer relationship with the chief received an average of 8 percentage points more votes, an effect size that is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The second model shows the effect of chiefs' relationships to MPs in chiefdoms that had a clear ethnic alignment (i.e. either Bemba speakers or Tonga speakers made up a majority of the population). In these locations, the candidate preferred by the chief received an average of just 3.6 percentage points more votes, an effect size that is not statistically significant. Thus, the electoral effects of chief's relationships with candidates is more than twice as large in communities without clear ethnic alignments.
II. Effects of Traditional Leaders' Support by Ethnic Alignment: Evidence from Zambia

III. Robustness Test 1: Results without Lesotho
Lesotho is the only country in the analysis that is ethnically homogenous. All of the other countries contain multiple ethnic groups competing for power, but in Lesotho, virtually the entire population identifies as Basotho. Politics is not divided along ethnic cleavages, and thus the multi-ethnic coalition-building theory should have limited relevance. It follows that support for the theory should as strong (or stronger) if Lesotho is dropped from the sample, and the results in table 2 show that this is correct. The table shows that centralization has no effect when areas are ethnically aligned with major political parties, but it has a positive effect (significant at the 95 percent confidence level) when areas are non-aligned politically. Similarly, the effect of non-alignment is not statistically different from zero when groups are not centralized, but it is positive and statistically significant at the 90 percent level when groups are centralized. The multi-ethnic coalition building theory outlined in the paper could in theory apply not just to the power of traditional leaders are allowed over land but to the amount of power ceded to them more generally. To test whether the theory explains traditional leader's levels of power more generally, table 3 re-runs model 2 from the main manuscript but using the proportion of the population who said that traditional leaders had "a great deal" of influence in governing their local community as the dependent variable.
IV. Robustness Test 2: Influence of Traditional Leaders on Local Governance
The results are mainly consistent with the expectations of the multi-ethnic coalition building theory. As expected, the centralization of ethnic groups only has a significant positive effect when these groups are not ethnically aligned with political parties. Interestingly, non-ethnic alignment has a significant negative effect on power in the cases of non-centralized groups and has a positive (but statistically insignificant) effect in the case of centralized groups.
V. Full Description of Cross-Sectional Data Set
The unit of analysis in the data set is generally the first administrative level below the country level. These subnational units were chosen mainly because they are the smallest unit at which the Afrobarometer surveys were designed to be representative. Many of the sub-national variables were constructed in ArcGIS using regional boundary maps that identified the location of each of the regions in the Afrobarometer data. Wherever possible, I used boundary maps available from Map Library (http://www.maplibrary.org/), but at times I needed to adjust these boundary maps in order to reflect the regional units included in the Afrobarometer survey.
Country-level Variables
British Colony: This is a dichotomous measure coded based on Englebert's measure of colonial identity. Area (log): This is equal to the log of the area of the country (measured in decimal degrees squared). Non-compactness: This measures the country's compactness using a measure proposed by Schwartzberg. It measures compactness as the ratio of the country's perimeter to the length of the perimeter of a circle of equal area. Specifically, this measure is calculated as p/(2 √ ) where p is a country's perimeter and A is a country's area. The area and perimeter measures were calculated in ArcGIS.
Sub-national Variables
Chief's Power over Land: This measure was constructed from q58f of the Afrobarometer Survey (Round 4). This question asked respondents, "Who do you think actually has primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks. Is it the central government, the local government, traditional leaders, or members of your community? Allocating land." Respondents were divided into two categories -those that said that traditional leaders were primarily responsible and those who said the central or local government was primarily responsible. (In Nigeria, respondents could also answer "state government", which was included with the latter category.) Only 7 percent of respondents answered "members of the community" and these observations were dropped. The Afrobarometer data was weighted to ensure representativeness and then aggregated at the sub-national level so that the final measure equals the number of respondents who said traditional leaders have primary responsibility for allocating land over the number of respondents who said traditional leaders or the central government or the local government (or the state government in Nigeria) have primary responsibility for allocating land. Centralization: This is a binary variable indicating whether or not the largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit is "centralized", which means that it has chiefs with significant jurisdictional power above the village level. Wherever possible, this is coded based on the "jurisdictional hierarchy" score reported in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas. All ethnic groups that scored 1.5 or higher on jurisdictional hierarchy are coded as hierarchical. Where an ethnic group in the Afrobarometer data is composed of more than one group from the Murdock data, the measure reflects the average degree of hierarchy among the sub-groups. A complete list of the data sources used to code this variable is explained later in the on-line appendix. Proportion Decade without Political Alignment: This variable indicates the proportion of years between 1998 and 2007 in which neither the president/prime minister nor the leader of the major opposition party were from the largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit. The largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit was identified by tabulating q79 of the Afrobarometer by sub-national unit. Question q79 asked respondents "What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group?" The number of years in the previous decade in which the president/prime minister or the leader of the major opposition party was from that ethnic group was coded by determining the ethnicity of the president/prime minister and the leader of the biggest opposition party. The biggest opposition party in a particular year is coded as the party of the opposition candidate that won the second most votes in the previous presidential election (or parliamentary election, in the case of parliamentary systems). This was determined using the African Election Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/). In cases where no opposition candidate won more than 15 percent of the vote (in the first round), there is not considered to be a major opposition party in the country. The ethnicity of the president/prime minister and the leader of the biggest opposition party was coded from a variety of sources indicated later in the appendix.
Proportion 1980s without Political Alignment:
This variable indicates the proportion of years between 1980 and 1989 in which neither the president/prime minister nor the leader of the major opposition party were from the largest ethnic group in the sub-national unit. The ethnicity of the president/prime minister and the leader of the biggest opposition party was coded from a variety of sources indicated later in the appendix. "Museveni tour dampens FDC hopes in Ankole, " The Observer, Jan 13, 2011 . "Surreal Succession," Africa Confidential, Nov. 17, 2006 .
"Ulenga's Challenge," Africa Confidential, April 2, 1999. 1 67 At (Shona subgroup) 2 *indicates uncertainty in coding **I could not find information specific to these tribes, so they are presumed to follow the general patterns described in this article Notes: The coding indicates whether or not an ethnic group is organized into petty chiefdoms. Wherever possible, this is coded from the jurisdictional hierarchy scores in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas; all ethnic groups that scored 1.5 or higher were coded as hierarchical. In some cases, ethnic groups referred to in the Afrobarometer were "cluster names" in the ethnographic Atlas. In this case, I assigned the average jurisdictional hierarchy score to the ethnic group Sources: EA (1967) refers to Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, Ethnology (Year/Edition) refers to an edition of the periodical Ethnography. 
X. Coding Hierarchy of Groups
XI. Full Citations for Hierarchy Data
XII. Rules for Coding Increases and Decreases in Chiefs' Power over Land
DEFINITIONS/CODING RULES
Laws are coded as decreasing the power of traditional chiefs if: (a) the law decreases the power of chiefs (or their appointees) over the allocation of land from the previous law/official policy (i.e. by setting up other bodies to take over land allocation functions) OR (b) the law abolishes chiefs who previously had a role in allocating land i. by removing recognition from them OR ii. by preventing customary chiefs from becoming administrative chiefs 1 OR (c) the law decreases the amount of land of which chiefs are trustees Laws are coded as increasing the power of traditional chiefs if: (a) the law increases the power of chiefs (or their appointees) over the allocation of land from the previous law/official policy OR (b) the law provides formal recognition to previously unrecognized traditional authorities and gives them a role in administering land OR (c) the law increases the amount of land of which chiefs are trustees OR (d) the law reverses a decrease in power as described in part 1.
RESEARCH PROTOCOL
The project collected information on formal increases and decreases in the power of chiefs over the administration of land in each country between the year of independence to 2005. In order for a practice to constitute a formal increase or decrease in the power of chiefs, it must be enacted via a law or a government decree. Decreases in the power of chiefs prior to independence are not included in the study.
